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Khamenei’s Principle for Iraq, Lebanon: Change is Forbidden

Khamenei’s Principle for Iraq, Lebanon: Change is Forbidden

Wednesday, 6 November, 2019 - 08:15
Linking the revolutions in Iraq and Lebanon with regional plots and developments is a corrupt thinking. This is what the internal situation in both countries says, as well as the opinions, attitudes, and actions that accompany and describe these situations.

But the corrupt thinking stems from a corrupt consciousness, a conspiratorial consciousness mixed with a deep desire to use both countries and their events in regional conflicts.

In the revolutionary situations of Iraq and Lebanon, theories of all kinds cannot hide a blatant Iranian role, not in a conspiratorial sense, but in a sense that seeks to be objective. It can be demonstrated in Hassan Nasrallah’s words and deeds, as in Ali Khamenei’s tweets.

Tehran, which has a tense relationship with its territory and with the world, cannot act as a state that respects its borders, nor does it have the characteristics to work within the conditions of peace.

Change in Iraq, as well as in Lebanon should be rejected, because, according to the Iranian point of view, these two countries are strategic locations for Iran. In war and tension, sacrificing a war position becomes a luxury that the commander of warriors cannot afford.

This explains events in the Arab Mashreq since international concerns have arisen over Iran’s nuclear program. For example, in the summer of 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution requiring Tehran to “immediately and completely cease” its uranium enrichment activities, to sign the Additional Protocol to the NPT, and to allow immediate “unconditional” inspection of Iranian nuclear facilities. In 2004, the extension of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s tenure was a means to insist on excluding any change in Lebanon.

The same desire, but to a greater extent, was that of the Syrian regime that was appalled by the US invasion of Iraq: the same year, in 2004, Al-Qamishli rebelled against Assad’s rule, and UN Resolution 1559 was passed to make Lebanon a normal country.

The most flagrant and dangerous example was the involvement of Iran and Hezbollah in suppressing the Syrian revolution. Change is forbidden within the Iranian spheres of influence. It is forbidden as long as Tehran is at war or in tension. Tehran, by its very nature, is always in this situation.

With differences in size and importance, we fall on the same principle in previous imperial experiments.

In modern Egyptian history, there is the “February 4, 1942” incident, when the English forced King Farouk to hand over the government to the leader of Al-Wafd, Mustafa al-Nahas. They did so out of fear of a government that would be sympathetic to the Axis during World War II, thus to prevent those from benefiting from Egypt’s strategic positions and the Suez Canal.

The Soviet empire knew more than one experiment: Hungarian reformist demands in 1956 and the Czechoslovakian demands in 1968, which were suppressed by the tanks of the Warsaw Pact.

In Poland, in late 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared customary rulings in an attempt to crush the newly formed Solidarity Union. Later, in 1990, Jaruzelski apologized to the Poles for doing so. He said that he was forced to block the Warsaw Pact’s intervention.

The policy of rejecting the change in the imperial world was ruled by, at least since 1968, what became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. This principle, which coincided with and justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia, argued that any threat to any socialist system, in any country of the Eastern camp, was a threat to the whole camp.

This is why the countries of the camp could face such threats with repression. Twenty years later, Mikhail Gorbachev renounced this principle, and the Warsaw Pact countries collapsed.

Iran’s situation with the Levant is not much different. The American retreat has indeed provided it with exceptional opportunities. But this is not enough. The problem that arises in Iraq first and then in Lebanon is that Iran cannot build alternative situations to those that it undermines.

It carries a penniless and beleaguered imperial project that succeeds in undermining and fails to build.

In addition to the problem of Iran, there is the problem of its wings, whether in Iraq or Lebanon. These wings want to seize power in their own countries and don’t want to do so at the same time. They own, control, but are not held accountable. Such a situation is always explosive, especially in the face of severe economic crises.

After standing up to other sectarian and ethnic forces, Iraq indicates that the dispute has reached the Shiite environment itself. In Lebanon, disharmony emerged for the first time between Hezbollah and its environment, and between the party and some of its allies.

This project, represented by its leadership in Tehran or its extensions in Baghdad and Beirut, is not open to politics. Whenever a thousand Iraqis or Lebanese gathered in a square, the Iranian-sponsored powers expressed fear and distress.

It is a situation that only survives in a margin between tension and violence, accompanied by economic decline: if this project prospers, the demands of the people calling for change go with the wind. The change will happen with the defeat of the principle of Khamenei.

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