America’s Foreign Policy and Grand Strategies
America’s Foreign Policy and Grand Strategies
The foreign policy community is furiously debating what grand strategy America should pursue in an age of accelerating international rivalry. But what if America, whipsawed by populism, polarization and disillusion, is becoming incapable of pursuing any grand strategy whatsoever?
This dreary prognosis has become more common as academics and policy analysts grapple with the causes and consequences of Donald Trump’s presidency. And although there is good reason to worry, it is too soon to pronounce the passing of American internationalism just yet.
The most recent exposition of the “It’s all over” thesis comes from Daniel Drezner of Tufts University. In a provocative essay and an accompanying blog post, Drezner argues that the problem with US foreign policy is not simply that American power is declining. It is that the political foundations of American statecraft have crumbled.
“The Blob,” to use a term popularized by top Obama adviser Ben Rhodes, has been discredited by unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The longstanding bipartisan consensus on American global engagement has been replaced by intensifying polarization that causes wild gyrations whenever the White House changes hands. The American people have simply become less interested in foreign affairs since the end of the Cold War.
The result is that US foreign policy seems ever less credible and constant at a time when the world badly needs a steadying hand. Inertia and tradition will keep the American world order together for a while, but as countries lose confidence in America, the system will ultimately break down.
I have a fair amount of sympathy for this argument. In our recent book, “The Lessons of Tragedy,” Charles Edel and I argue that America’s success in creating such a benign, prosperous world has, ironically, made it possible for Americans to forget why they should be so deeply involved in the world in the first place. It is indisputable that the end of the Cold War made it harder for Americans to intuitively grasp the purpose of US alliances and other overseas commitments. In all but one presidential election since 1992, in fact, Americans have chosen the presidential candidate who promised to be more restrained in world affairs than the candidate who promised to be more active. According to a 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center, a record number of Americans — 57 percent — believed that the US should basically mind its business and let other countries handle their own. As for the Blob and its misjudgments, it is no coincidence that America’s two most recent presidents — a Democrat and a Republican alike — have both found it profitable to use the foreign policy elite to achieve ends.
Finally, while the degree of the present political polarization is sometimes exaggerated, the problem is getting worse.
There are unmistakable signs of decay in the internationalist consensus, and if that decay advances it will have profound implications for America’s ability to preserve the world it has built.
Fortunately, there are still key reasons why it is too early to conclude that all is lost.
The political foundations of US foreign policy have been tested before, and they have survived pressures that seemed far worse than the ones at work today. In the mid-1970s, the Vietnam War had discredited an earlier foreign policy elite — the “best and the brightest” — even more thoroughly than the Iraq War discredited the Blob. Polarization was intense and often violent; pursuing a centrist foreign policy seemed impossible.
American will and commitment were in serious doubt. Within a few years, the traumas inflicted by Vietnam were easing. The Cold War consensus was reasserting itself, as aggressive Soviet behavior reminded Americans why the superpower rivalry needed waging.
This relates to another reason for optimism: One can now see, however faintly, the outlines of a new consensus. Since the Cold War, policymakers have struggled to persuade Americans that there is a threat against which the US-led international system needed to be defended. But that threat is rapidly presenting itself today, in the form of aggressive behavior by hostile authoritarian powers.
Russia’s election-meddling in the US has produced a bipartisan desire to better compete with the Kremlin, as demonstrated by broad support for enhancing NATO’s defenses and keeping Moscow under sanctions. Trump and some of his die-hard followers may be pro-Putin, in other words, but hardly anyone else is.